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  Institutions shape the long-run development path of nations because these humanly 
devised constraints, by structuring the incentives of exchange in the economic, political, and 
social spheres, influence the accumulation of knowledge and the production of goods and 
services. Poor institutions are likely to arise when economic resources are concentrated in the 
hands of a few elites who have incentives to structure institutions for the benefit of the few. 
Democratic institutions, which are more conducive to economic growth, may arise when 
economic resources are distributed more equally. However, because institutions and the 
distribution of economic resources are both endogenously determined, it is difficult to identify 
the impact of institutions on economic growth. 
  The European colonization presents an important potential source of exogenous variation 
in the distribution of institutions around the world. North (1990) and La Porta et. al. (1998a, 
1998b) believe that the development paths of colonial economies are explained by the identities 
of the colonizing European nations. North (1990) and North and Weingast (1989) argue that 
whereas England, with the triumph of the Parliament, emerged with secure property rights and an 
impartial judicial system, Spain’s centralized bureaucracy led to poor property rights and legal 
systems. La Porta et. al. (1988a, 1988b) find that nations that adopted British common law rather 
than civil law, which originates from Roman law, possessed stronger legal rules protecting 
corporate shareholders and creditors. 
  Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) and Acemoglu et. al. (2001, 2002) believe that the 
distribution of institutions around the world was also significantly influenced by local geographic 
conditions. For Engerman and Sokoloff, poor institutions arose in the New World colonies in the 
Caribbean, Brazil and the southern United States where geography and climate were suited for 
  3plantation economies, and in Mexico and Peru, where there were significant indigenous 
populations and land was granted to few elites. On the other hand, democratic institutions arose 
in areas, such as in the northern United States and Canada, where geography and climate favored 
small scale farming.  
  For Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2004), the distribution of institutions is determined by 
initial conditions in settler mortality and native population density. In places where mortality 
rates were high, the Europeans did not have the incentive to settle in large numbers and establish 
the more democratic form of institutions developed in Europe. Likewise, in places where 
Europeans found dense native populations, such as in the Mughal, Aztec, and Inca empires, 
Acemoglu et al. argue that Europeans simply took over the existing native institutions which 
favored local elites. 
  The case of India does not fall neatly into any of our current categories of understanding 
on the subject of colonial institutions and development. India is endowed with a tropical climate, 
fertile soil and possessed a large native population. Yet, in India, unlike in the other tropical 
colonies, the British did not develop extensive plantation economies.
1 Due to its tropical disease 
environment and the pre-existing dense native population, British immigration to India was 
limited.
2 Yet, despite the small number of British immigrants, the British government established 
institutions in India based on private property rights and an English-type judicial system for the 
native populations. In a land where property rights were informal, complex, overlapping, and 
                                                 
1 The British owned or leased plantations in tea, indigo, and coffee. Of the three crops, tea was the most important 
and it represented about 20% in value of the eight most important non-food grain crops in 1923-1947 (Blyn (1966)). 
In terms of acreage, however, these crops accounted for a miniscule amount of Indian agriculture (Tomlinson 
(1993)). British firms were also involved in a variety of manufacturing from the production of jute, cotton, and 
machinery, but their most important presence was in their control of transportation networks, exports and imports 
(see Bagchi (1972, p. 183)). 
2 British views of Indians and Indian climate evolved over time with changes in theories of race and disease as well 
as with the new emerging information from European experiences in Asia (Harrison (1999)). But by the early 
nineteenth century, the British believed that India’s climate was generally incompatible with the European 
constitution. 
  4locally defined by tradition and village leaders, the British attempted to introduce an impersonal, 
bureaucratic, modern form of property rights. 
  Why did the British want to introduce a system of private property rights in India? We 
believe that there were two important inter-related reasons. First, in India, unlike in the New 
World, the military costs of taking land from natives were likely to have been prohibitive. As a 
consequence, the British, like the Mughals before them, focused their energies on extracting land 
rents from peasant farmers. Second, the focus on land taxes aligned the economic incentives of 
the British administrators with those of cultivators. A majority of the British administrators 
believed that private property rights in India would unleash economic development and raise tax 
revenue for the British government.
3
  Even though the British administrators were unified in their belief that private property 
rights would increase agricultural productivity, they adopted two very different strategies for 
assigning property rights and taxes. In some areas (Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, and 
some parts of Madras Presidency), property rights to land and taxes were assigned to a few 
landlords or zamindars who, in turn, set and collected taxes from cultivators or ryotwars. In 
others (most of Madras, Bombay Presidencies, and Assam), however, property rights to land and 
taxes were assigned directly to cultivators. Because land ownership was concentrated in the 
hands of few elites in landlord as compared to non-landlord areas, the landlord elites in these 
areas had significant interest in structuring the political institutions for their own benefit.
4
                                                 
3 Warren Hastings worked out the first unified British policy in India based on tax-farming. The system auctioned 
off estates and farmed them out to the highest bidders for short-term leases not extending beyond five years. Most 
subsequent administrators believed that tax-farming was a failure. They believed that tax-farming led to poor 
incentives for development because its lack of permanence subverted property rights (Guha (1963, p.8)). The 
Permanent Settlement of Bengal in 1793, which replaced the tax-farming system, was designed to establish property 
rights. While administrators held different views on how to govern India, “the greatest common measure of their 
agreement” was on the importance of private property rights (see Guha (1963), Stokes (1959), Stein (1989)).  
4 For example, Cohn (1961) argues that, in the landlord region of Banaras, the eastern end of today’s Uttar Pradesh, 
the British legal system was used by the elites to acquire valuable lands. Elites identified valuable land and then 
  5  In this paper, we examine the long-run impact of the two differing assignments of 
property rights and land taxes in India between 1901 and 1991.
5 We build on the important work 
of Banerjee and Iyer (2005) who estimate the impact of landlord and non-landlord systems of 
land tenures on agricultural productivity in post-independence India between 1958 and 1991.
6 
We believe that an examination of the period in which these land revenue systems were in effect 
during the pre-independence period are likely to shed important insights on the impact of these 
institutions on the Indian economy. 
  There are several potential causes of divergence in the economies between landlord and 
non-landlord districts during the pre- and post-independence periods. First, the colonial 
government was more likely to invest in irrigation and railroads in non-landlord areas where land 
                                                                                                                                                             
made sure that owners of these lands did not pay revenue. Failure of payment led to forced auctions where the land 
was subsequently purchased by elites. Cohn (1961, 622): “Under the regulations of 1793, it was assumed that by 
stabilizing landed relations, providing security of property, making peoples’ rights explicit through the publication 
of the laws, and providing an impartial judge making decisions on the basis of evidence and arguments in open 
court, the happiness and security of the Indian population would be secured. In fact this did not occur. Charles 
Metcalf in 1815 expressed a view which was held by many English: ‘Our Courts of Justice are generally spoken [of] 
with disgust, with ridicule, or with fear... They [the Indians] abuse the latter [the courts] as scenes of injustice and 
corruption where nothing is obtained but by bribery.” Nakazato (1994) reaches a similar conclusion for Bengal. 
5 What type of property rights system emerged in India? Because of differing local political and cultural conditions, 
the nature of property rights in India varied greatly. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) write that a landlord’s property right 
was one of revenue-collecting rights, which could be bought and sold, rather than proprietary rights. However, this 
view seems to be based on southern India where property rights of zamindars were least secure (Kumar (1965)). 
Baker (1976) writes that in Madras a bizarre court judgment in 1870, followed by the Land Act of 1908, changed the 
legal relationship between landlords and tenants where tenants’ rights were restored to “status quo ante” – giving the 
tenant the right of land ownership and leaving only the right of revenue collection to landlords. Because the 
landlords could not effectively use the courts to collect rents from tenants, Baker argues that they resorted to other 
means such as control of credit, water, and marketing to gain leverage over tenants. Scholars of southern India such 
as Baker (1984) and Frykenberg (1965) generally emphasize the limitations of British power and authority. 
However, in northern India, many scholars believe that the landlords were able to attain proprietary rights to land. 
“Owing to the tightening alliance between the British and zamindars during and after the Indian Mutiny, even the 
Courts had begun to decree that the land itself had also belonged to Zamindars and peasants were only tenants-at-
will. (Ranga and Saraswathi (1979, p.50))” Even in some areas of Madras, Reddy (1989, p.275) argues that 
“jagirdars, zamindars and desmukhs” were able to exploit the courts to turn cultivators to tenants-at-will. Nakazato 
(1994) provides a detailed examination of the operation of land markets in Bengal. He demonstrates that landlords 
were able to use their political power in concert with the British to acquire proprietary rights in land and establish a 
landlord-sharecropping system between 1870 and 1910. Similar views are held by Chatterjee (1984), Chaudhari 
(1984) and Shukla (1993). The emergence of a land market in India where property was bought and sold in high 
volume is prima facie evidence of a radical change in the conception of property rights in India (see Baker (1976), 
Chaudhari (1975), and Neale (1962)). 
6 There was a bewildering array of land tenure arrangements in India, but scholars generally recognize three major 
land tenure systems: landlord (zamindari or malguzari), individual cultivator (ryotwari) and village (mahalwari). The 
non-landlord system is composed of the latter two categories. See Baden-Powell (1892) and Roy (2000). 
  6taxes could be adjusted rather than in landlord areas where tax rates were set permanently.
7 
Second, landlord areas faced greater agency problems in agriculture. In the landlord areas, a 
great majority of farms were worked by sharecroppers whereas in the non-landlord areas, it was 
farmed by owners and renters.
8 Third, in the landlord districts, tenancy reforms increased the 
level of uncertainty of property rights.
9 Finally, local district spending in public goods such as 
education or roads may differ between landlord and non-landlord areas. The varying levels of 
expenditures may reflect differences in the preferences of local elites or differences in the ability 
of local governments to solve collective action problems.
10
  We estimate the impact of land revenue systems on economic performance by adopting 
the empirical approach used in Banerjee and Iyer (2005). We regress measures of economic 
performance on geographic control variables, length of British rule, and whether a district was 
historically organized as a landlord or a non-landlord district. Whereas Banerjee and Iyer focus 
on agricultural productivity and investments, we broaden the investigation to other measures of 
development such as urbanization, employment in manufacturing and services, and population 
density for the pre- and post-independence periods.
11
                                                 
7 See Whitcombe (1983), Boyce (1987), Hurd (1983), Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and others. 
8 Banerjee et. al (2002) provide a useful model of agricultural tenancy in India. While the model is used to 
investigate tenancy reforms in the post-independence period, we believe that the model applies to the pre-
independence period as well. In the base model where tenants cannot be evicted, the first best solution is a rental 
contract. If the wealth of tenants is too low for a rental contract, then the tenant’s effort level is less than first-best 
and is a positive function of the tenant’s outside options. The authors show that agency costs typically lead to less 
than first-best level of effort from tenants as well as investments from landlord and tenants. If model allows the 
landlords to evict tenants, then the effort level of tenants is inversely correlated with landlords’ bargaining power 
over tenants. Landlords can use the power of eviction threats to elicit more effort from poor tenants. In this model, 
tenancy reform lowers the effort level of tenants but increases the share received by tenants. Besley and Burgess 
(2000) present a different model of tenancy which has essentially the same predictions as those of Banerjee et. al 
(2002). Also see Bardhan (1984). 
9 See Chatterjee (1984), Appu (1975), Besley and Burgess (2000), and Frankel and Rao (1989, 1990). 
10 In the colonial period, Chaudhary (2005) finds that local district boards who determined local public expenditures 
were often controlled by high caste Brahmans. In the post-independence period, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) argue that 
local public developmental expenditures were determined by the ability of local governments to solve collective 
action problems.  
11 Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2003) argue that urbanization and population densities, to a lesser extent, are useful 
measures of economic development. 
  7  We prefer the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates over those of instrumental variables 
(IV) based on Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) instrument for a variety of reasons.
12 First, we are able 
to establish the direction of the omitted variable bias because the landlord districts were likely to 
have been more productive than non-landlord districts at the time of British annexation.
13 Since 
our results generally show that non-landlord districts performed better than landlord districts, our 
OLS estimates are likely to be biased downwards. Second, there is little potential for 
simultaneity bias or reverse causality. The introduction of a private property rights system 
enforced by a strong secular state by the British was exogenous.
14 Third, measurement error is 
likely to involve our dependent rather than our independent variables.
15 Fourth, Banerjee and 
                                                 
12 For the independent variable which measures the impact of land tenures, Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) construct a 
measure of non-landlord control based on data on the proportion of villages, estates, or land area not under landlord 
control from the 1870s and 1880s. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) argue that the OLS estimates of this non-landlord 
variable are unlikely to be systematically biased upwards for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, they also formulate 
an instrumental variables strategy. Their instrument is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the area came 
under British rule between 1820 and 1856 and zero otherwise. This IV strategy is based on the belief that all districts 
annexed after 1820 were predominantly designated as non-landlord areas due to Munro’s political victory over the 
Board of Revenue in Madras. 
13 Most scholars such as Stokes (1978), Ludden (1984), and Boserup (1965) believe that landlord classes arose in 
the more fertile regions. In the fertile, densely populated, rain-fed, rice-based areas such as in Bengal, they believe 
that the conditions were conducive for the emergence of a landlord class whereas in the sparsely populated, drier, 
millet-based areas such as Madras, agriculture was not sufficiently productive for such a class to arise. While 
agricultural data on early nineteenth century India are sparse, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find some evidence that 
landlord areas were more productive than non-landlord areas during the period of early British rule. 
14 The British did not simply adopt the Mughal institutions as described in Habib (1999) and Saran (1973). First, the 
British possessed superior military strength than those of previous rulers. Frankel (1989, 1) writes that, unlike the 
British, “Neither the Moslem and Mughal imperia nor the great Hindu empires of ancient and medieval India 
exercised centralized bureaucratic control through ownership of land and revenue extraction, or wielded a monopoly 
of force within the territory defined as their dominion.” Second, the British were either ignorant of local institutions 
or could not help but alter the existing property rights institutions. The case of Punjab is illustrative. Under the 
Mughals, Punjab, a non-landlord province under British rule, was locally ruled by zamindars but its political 
landscape was altered significantly by the rise of the Sikhs in the last half of the eighteenth century. Even though the 
British policy under James Thomason, architect of the Ceded and Northwest Provinces, was conservative, Kessinger 
(1974, p.77-8) argues that “the goal of conserving rural society as the revenue officials found it proved difficult to 
attain because revenue officials were continually confronted by complexities which forced them to make series of 
decisions that resulted in innovation and change.” One of these innovations was to make the bhaiachara (the 
proprietary group in villages where all landowners are descended from a common ancestor and are treated as a 
corporate group by the government) collectively responsible for the collection and payment of revenue was new. 
Even in the British non-landlord areas such as Punjab, by establishing proprietary rights in land, the British 
fundamentally altered older social relationships based on traditional notions of property. 
15 Banerjee and Iyer (2005) address the issue of measurement error in their non-landlord variable which we use in 
our paper. They argue that this measurement error is likely to bias the OLS estimates downwards but the IV 
estimates upwards. 
  8Iyer’s IV estimates may ignore useful information. The main difference between the OLS and IV 
estimates stems from the classification of non-landlord districts which were annexed prior to 
1820. Because non-landlord districts annexed prior to 1820 are treated as if they are landlord 
districts in the IV specification, we believe that the IV estimates lose relevant variations in the 
data. Finally, we test for the robustness of our results by restricting our sample to a subset of 
neighboring districts which share borders and by clustering our standard errors by provinces and 
by districts. 
  Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that the divergence in economic performance between non-
landlord and landlord regions began after 1965 with the advent of the Green Revolution. After 
1965, the government of India increased its efforts to disseminate new high-yielding varieties of 
crops and to build public infrastructure in rural areas. The authors believe, however, that landlord 
areas failed to take advantage of these new opportunities as class-based antagonism in these 
areas, created by the historical inequity in the distribution of land, increased the collective action 
costs for the provision of local public goods investments in health, education and agricultural 
technologies. 
  In this paper, we find that relative agricultural productivities of landlord and non-landlord 
districts varied over time. In 1901, there were no discernible differences in productivity between 
landlord and non-landlord areas, but in 1931 there is evidence of higher productivity in non-
landlord districts.
16 In the post-independence period, agricultural productivities of these regions 
seem to have converged in the period 1958-1961, but then diverged again after 1961 as non-
landlord regions became much more productive than landlord areas and the degree of divergence 
widened even more after 1965 with the implementation of the Green Revolution. 
                                                 
16 There is extensive debate on the quality of agricultural data from the British colonial period. We address this 
issue in the data section and in the appendix. 
  9  For other proxy measures of productivity or development, however, we find that non-
landlord and landlord regions diverged during the British colonial period and continued to 
diverge after independence. Because data on acreage are likely to be much more reliable than 
those on yields for the colonial period, we examine the distribution of acreage between non-food 
and food crops. In the pre-independence period, Blyn (1966) finds that non-food crops were 2 to 
3 times more productive than food crops and that these differences widened over time in most 
British provinces. We find that non-landlord areas were significantly more specialized in non-
food crops and that these patterns continued through the post-independence period. We believe 
that our finding lends credence to the idea that non-landlord areas were more responsive to 
market opportunities and were more likely to shift into the more productive non-food crops. 
  We also find that non-landlord districts were more urbanized for every decade between 
1901 and 1941 and that they continued to be more urbanized through the post-independence 
period. In the pre-independence period, the lack of industrial data precludes us to examine the 
causes of urbanization, but we find clear evidence in the post-independence period that non-
landlord districts were more urbanized because they were centers of manufacturing and service 
employment. Finally, despite the fact that non-landlord districts seem to have diverged from 
landlord districts, we find that population densities of non-landlord and landlord districts were no 
different after controlling for other factors. 
  While it is extremely difficult to establish the causes of divergence in the economic 
performances between landlord and non-landlord districts, we believe that the divergence was 
caused by differing institutional developments in these two regions. In the pre-independence 
period, agricultural investments and productivity in landlord areas were more likely to suffer 
from agency costs and greater uncertainty in property rights. The ability of landlords to extract 
  10effort and rents from tenants was likely to be functions of land tenancy reforms. When landlords 
possessed considerable power, they were likely to extract a significant level of effort from 
tenants through threats of eviction or extra-legal coercion and maintain high levels of 
productivity. However, when tenancy reforms reduced the landlord’s bargaining power, 
agricultural productivity likely fell as the effort levels of tenants declined. 
  Because the bargaining power of landlord elites increased when the economic 
alternatives of their tenants were more limited, landlords had incentives to limit the economic 
and geographic mobility of tenants and laborers. Landed elites who controlled district boards 
were less likely to promote spending on public education. They were also less likely to promote 
infrastructural investments for urbanization. Even in the post-independence period, while other 
factors such as collective action costs may have become important over time, we believe that 
agency costs and property rights uncertainty continued to depress investments and productivity 
in the historically landlord areas. 
 
II. Data and Empirical Strategy 
  We use district level data from 9 provinces of British India.
17 Data at the district level are 
constructed for the period between 1901 to 1991 using various decadal censuses, District 
Gazetteers, National Sample Survey, World Bank data, and other census reports. The 
                                                 
17 A district in India is an administrative unit below the state level. These districts are also a part of present-day 
India with minor changes in district boundaries for some of them. Present day and older district boundaries have 
been matched to account for these changes. The Provinces of India were those portions of India that were ruled 
directly by officials of the British East India Company until the middle of the 19
th century and were under the direct 
control of the British crown from 1858 until Indian Independence in 1947. During the years 1947-1950, Independent 
India was divided into 19 provinces and hundreds of princely states, which were replaced with states and union 
territories in 1950 when the Indian Constitution came into effect. We have included districts from 9 provinces. The 
included provinces are Madras, Bombay, Ajmer, North-West Province, Panjab, Central Provinces, Berar, Oudh, and 
Bengal. Most of the excluded provinces are now a part of Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, and Yemen and thus no 
longer belong to the Indian territory and for few others, there is major lack in availability of data. We have also 
included a few of the princely states in our data sample for some of the regressions. Since some districts of British 
India became parts of Pakistan and Bangladesh, data on these districts are omitted for the post-independence India.  
  11Agricultural Statistics of India and various provinces’ Season & Crops Reports for different 
years were the major source of pre-independence period agriculture-related data. The India 
Database Project by Vanneman, Reeve and Barnes (2000) proved an important source of post-
independence period census data. Some of the geographic control variables and post-
independence period agricultural data are taken from the India Agriculture and Climate Data Set 
(compiled by the World Bank using official government publications) and the Maps of India 
website.
18
  Following Banerjee and Iyer (2005), we estimate the regression of the form: 
(1) Yi  = a + b NLi + c BRi + d Xi + εi 
where Yi is the dependent variable in district i and the independent variables are - NLi, the share 
of the land under a non-landlord land revenue system, BRi, the length of British rule in district i, 
and, Xi, the geographic control variables. Since district level measures of output or income are 
unavailable, we use agricultural productivity, urbanization, shares of workforce in manufacturing 
and services, and population density as dependent variables. NLi and BRi are Banerjee and Iyer’s 
(2005) ‘proportion of non-landlords’ variable and the ‘length of British control’ variable.
19 
Geographic controls include altitude, latitude, rainfall, and various soil types (alluvial, black, and 
red) and whether a district was located on a coast. Although rainfall and soil conditions fluctuate 
with time, we assume that these geographic characteristics remained constant over time. Soil 
data are based on a visual inspection of maps from Raychaudhuri et. al. (1963); rainfall data are 
based on a 30-year norm between 1930 and 1961. 
                                                 
18 The Indian district database combines district-level data from census and agricultural sources between 1961 and 
1991 and also adjusts the district boundaries to create comparable units across the three decades. 
19 For areas where information was available, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) define the ‘proportion of non-landlord’ as 
the proportion of villages or estates or land area which was not under the revenue liability of landlords. For all other 
areas, they assign the non-landlord measure as either zero or one depending on the dominant form of land revenue 
system. 
  12  We present descriptive statistics of our data in Tables 1-3.
20 Table 1 indicates that 
landlord districts accounted for about 57% of total cultivated land area. Table 2 shows that India 
is a vast country with considerable variations in geographic characteristics in latitude, altitude, 
rainfall and soil conditions. In general, superior agricultural conditions exist in locations with 
lower altitudes, higher latitudes, greater rainfall, and soil in the form of alluvial and red soil 
rather than black soil. The data suggest that landlord districts possessed better geographic 
conditions for agriculture than non-landlord districts. 
  Despite the fact that non-landlord districts possessed inferior geographic conditions than 
landlord districts, summary statistics of our dependent variables in Table 3 reveal that the non-
landlord districts had higher agricultural productivity and higher shares of land allocated to the 
cultivation of non-food crops. Non-landlord districts were also more urbanized throughout and 
had greater shares of employment in manufacturing and services in the post-independence 
period. Population density, however, was higher in landlord districts for both the pre- and post-
independence periods. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
  In this section, we present a series of empirical evidence. First, we report in Tables 4-11 
the OLS and IV estimates for agricultural productivity, food grain productivity, non-food grain 
acreage share, urbanization, employment shares in manufacturing and services, and population 
densities for various years. Durban-Wu-Hauseman test could not reject the hypothesis that our 
OLS estimates are consistent.
21 Due to the potential presence of heteroskedasticity, we use t-
                                                 
20 For Tables 2 and 3, we define landlord districts as those districts with a greater proportion (> 0.5) of the area 
under landlordism. In our sample, this classification led to about 50% of districts falling under the category of 
landlord districts. 
21 See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). 
  13statistics based on Hubert/White standard errors. Second, we report in Tables 12-13 panel 
regressions where standard errors are clustered by district and by province. Finally, in Table 14, 
we report panel regression for a sub-sample of districts which share borders.
22
  A. Agricultural Productivity: Yield per Acre 
  Although comprehensive agricultural data exist for the British colonial period, there has 
been considerable debate on their quality. Scholars generally believe that data on acreage are 
likely to be more reliable than that on output; they also believe that the quality of data is superior 
in non-landlord than in landlord areas, especially where tax rates were set on a permanent 
basis.
23 Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assess whether the colonial 
data are flawed and to what extent they are flawed. Guha’s (1992) introduction provides an 
excellent summary of the debate.
24
  Blyn’s (1969) construction of the agricultural trends for the period 1891-1941 remains 
the most important work to date. Blyn finds that agricultural productivity in British India 
declined modestly between 1891 and 1941, but on closer examination, the data reveal that the 
                                                 
22 For a list of neighboring districts, see Table 5 of Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) web appendix. Due to data 
availability, our sample consists of 32 out of 35 districts in Banerjee and Iyer’s sample. 
23 In non-landlord areas, acreage data were collected by field-to-field inspections of villages by a trained village 
revenue officer (patwari). By contrast, in permanently settled landlord areas, the returns were made by a village 
policeman (chowkidar) who is thought to have been ill-equipped and untrained for field-to-field inspection. From 
the acreage data, agricultural output was calculated using information on standard yield and seasonal factor. 
Standard yield was obtained from crop-cutting experiments to be updated every five years; seasonal factors were 
provided by village revenue officers or policemen but were subject to revision by district and provincial officials. 
Incentives for under-reporting yields and acreage were likely to have been higher in non-landlord rather than in 
landlord areas, especially in places where tax rates were set on a permanent basis. 
24 Heston (1973, 1979) questions the reliability of Blyn’s (1966) estimates based on his work in Bombay. In that 
province, official standard yield estimates remained constant between 1897 and 1947 so that the only variation in 
overall yield came from changes in its seasonal factor. Heston argues that the decline in Bombay’s seasonal factor 
over time is not correlated with that region’s rainfall trends. On the other hand, Desai (1953), Mishra (1983), 
Dasgupta (1981), and Sivasubramonian (2000) generally find evidence in favor of Blyn’s estimates. McAlpin 
(1983), based on her extensive research on Bombay Presidency, believes that agricultural statistics in this province 
are generally of high quality. Yanagisawa (1996) finds that yields reported in Season and Crop Reports for Tamil 
districts accord well with yield estimates derived from various crop-cutting experiments. Islam (1978) finds official 
yields reported in Bengal differed modestly from the plot-to-plot enumeration and survey estimates conducted in 
1944/45. Unlike our study, however, none of these studies examines whether agricultural productivity at the district 
level correlates well with climate and geographic attributes. 
  14overall decline is caused by a sharp decline in the productivity of food crops and that the 
productivity of non-food crops actually rose over this period. Yet, data indicate only a minor 
substitution in acreage from food to non-food crops. At the provincial level, Blyn finds that 
agricultural productivity declined in Greater Bengal, rose in places like Punjab, and remained 
constant in most other provinces. 
  We use the official statistics to construct similar data on agricultural productivity but at 
the district rather than at the provincial level for 1901 and 1931.
25 Because data reported at the 
district level are less systematic and comprehensive than at the provincial level, our district level 
productivity estimates are likely to be less accurate than Blyn’s provincial estimates. District 
acreage data are most comprehensive; yield data on non-food crops are least comprehensive due 
to numerous missing data. In general, when we aggregate our district level productivity and 
acreage estimates to the provincial level, our estimates compare reasonably well with those of 
Blyn (see Appendix I). 
  Regression estimates for total agricultural productivity presented in Tables 4 and 5 
indicate that productivity between non-landlord and landlord districts was similar in 1901 but 
may have diverged in 1931. In 1931, agricultural productivity was 22% higher in non-landlord 
districts.
26 In the post-independence period, there is considerable evidence that agricultural 
productivity between non-landlord and landlord districts converged again in the period between 
1958 and 1961. The annual regressions reported in Table 5 indicate that agricultural productivity 
                                                 
25 We construct data on agricultural productivity (yield per acre) using the following crops. For food grains, crops 
include rice, wheat, barley, jowar (sorghum), bajra (pearl millet), maize, ragi (finger millet), gram (chickpea), and 
other food grains including pulses; for non-food grains, they include linseed, sesamum, rape, mustard, groundnut, 
sugarcane, tea, coffee, tobacco, cotton, and jute. For the pre-independence period, we use 1924/25-1928/29 crop 
prices from Blyn (1966) to obtain the value of aggregate agricultural output; for the post-independence period, we 
use contemporaneous prices. See Appendix I for more detail. 
26 Blyn (1966) discusses of the various determinants colonial agricultural productivity such as the composition of 
crops, water supply - irrigation and rainfall, double cropping, soil conditions, technology - improved seeds, 
education, implements, and labor.  
  15in non-landlord districts began to diverge between 1961 and 1965 and that their divergence 
seems to have accelerated after 1965 with the advent of the Green Revolution. In 1961, non-
landlord districts had 13% higher agricultural productivity whereas, in 1981, the figure rose to 
26%. Table 6 shows that similar results are obtained when we examine productivity of food 
grains. 
   Table 7 reports the regression estimates on the share of acreage devoted to non-food 
grain crops. In the pre-independence period, we find that non-landlord areas had about 33% 
higher proportion of their area cultivated under non-food grains in 1901-02 and that this 
difference increased to 57% in 1931-32.
27 Thus, there seems to be considerable evidence that 
non-landlord areas were responding faster to the commercialization of agriculture and shifting 
their production toward non-food cash crops which were generally more productive.
28 In the 
post-independence period, however, the differences in acreage devoted to non-food grain 
between landlord and non-landlord districts seem to have narrowed over time. 
  Geography was very important for agricultural productivity in both the pre- and post-
independence periods. We find that districts with alluvial or red soils were more productive than 
those with black soil; districts with higher rainfall were also more productive in food crops, 
                                                 
27 Blyn (1966, p.180-181) addresses the impact of crop composition on overall productivity: “Since nonfoodgrain 
yield per acre is generally higher in value than that of food-grains, a progressive increase in the proportion of 
cropland in nonfoodgrains would tend to raise all-crop yield per acre.”  
28 Due to differing geographic conditions, the share of non-food crops grown in non-landlord and landlord regions 
may differ. If the composition of crops differs, then the variations in acreage devoted to non-food grain may be 
accounted for by differences in the prices of these crops. We believe that the price variations are unlikely to explain 
the concentration of food crops in landlord areas. Islam (1978) finds that in Bengal, where most districts were 
landlord based, the price elasticity of acreage under cultivation was extremely low. A more interesting case study is 
presented by Baker’s (1984) study of Tamilnad. In this region, the valleys were controlled by mirasidars whereas the 
plains were inhabited by both landlords (zamindars) and non-landlords (ryotwars). The expansion in acreage 
towards non-food cash crops was most extensive in the plains whereas the valleys continued to concentrate their 
cultivation in paddy rice. These trends persisted even when the price of rice fell and prices of non-food crops 
increased. Baker argues that the zamindars lost considerable power over their tenants with the shift in cultivation 
into cash crops as transactions moved from zamindar’s estate office to cash-crop markets. Baker (1984, p. 219) 
writes: “Those large landholders who were excessively distanced from cultivation were unable to profit; ‘estate 
mirasidars’ in the valleys and zamindars in the plains actively resented the growth of commercial cropping because 
it loosened their remaining grip on their prospering subordinates and on the products of agriculture.” 
  16especially in the pre-independence period. Latitude and altitude were negatively correlated, but 
statistically insignificant. Districts located near the coast were more productive perhaps because 
higher moisture levels in coastal districts facilitate the breakdown of organic soil matter into 
minerals that support plant growth. 
  Geographic factors also influenced the distribution of acreage between food and non-food 
crops. The share of non-grain acreage was higher in districts with lower rainfall and higher 
altitude throughout; it was also higher in districts with great black and red soils in the pre-
independence period. Food grains rather than non-food grains are grown in high rainfall areas 
and non-food crops such as tea are grown in higher altitude locations. Moreover, important non-
food crops like cotton are intensive in black soil. 
  B. Urbanization 
  The definition of an urban area changed markedly between the pre- and the post-
independence periods.
29 But, unlike the agricultural data, there seems to be little controversy 
concerning the quality of the urban data. In the pre-independence period, urbanization levels 
were low but rose slightly over time; in the post-independence period, urbanization rates rose 
more significantly. In 1901 and 1941, the shares of urban population in India were 9.4% and 
                                                 
29 In the pre-independence period between 1901-1951, an urban area was defined as a town if it met one of the 
following criteria: (1) every municipality regardless of size, (2) a civil line not within municipal limits, (3) places 
5,000 persons or more which the Provincial Superintendent decides to treat as a town, or (4) places under 5,000 
persons which the Provincial Superintendent decides to treat as a town. However, Davis (1951) argues that towns 
with population less than 5,000 accounted for no more than 4-7% of the total urban population. In post-
independence India, the definition of an urban area changed from decade to decade making comparisons of 
aggregate urban levels over time very difficult. However the new definition was more uniformly applied across the 
Indian provinces and conformed more closely to the definition of an urban area. In general, an area was considered a 
town if it met the following conditions: (1) a density of not less than 1000 per square mile, (2) population of at least 
5000, (3) three-fourths of the occupations of the working population should be outside of agriculture, and (4) at the 
discretion of the Superintendent of the State, the place should have a few pronounced urban characteristics and 
amenities such as newly founded industrial areas, large housing settlements, or places of tourist importance, and 
other civic amenities. See Bose (1973). 
  1712.8% respectively; 1961 and 1991, using the revised urban definition, they were 14.0 and 
22.1%, respectively.
30
  We find that non-landlord districts were significantly more urbanized between 1901 and 
1941 (Table 8). In 1921, non-landlord districts were 47% more urbanized than landlord districts; 
in 1941, the figure was 40%. Despite the major changes in the definition of an urban area 
between the two periods, the regression estimates for the post-independence period are very 
similar to those of the pre-independence period. The OLS estimates indicate that the non-
landlord districts have a 28% higher proportion of urban population in 1961 and 1981 and about 
24% higher in 1991. We also find that districts with higher rainfall were less likely to be urban 
whereas districts with alluvial soil were more likely to be urban.
31 Districts in coastal locations 
were not significantly more urban since, despite possessing extensive miles of sea coasts, India is 
not endowed with good natural harbors.
32
  The regression results presented in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that, at least for the post-
independence period, non-landlord areas were more urbanized than landlord areas because they 
have higher shares of employment in manufacturing and services than landlord districts. In 
manufacturing employment, non-landlord districts had 57%, 45%, and 50% in 1961, 1971, and 
1981 respectively, but the figure dropped to 9% in 1991. Also, non-landlord regions had 22-27% 
higher share of service employment than landlord districts for the period between 1961-1991. 
                                                 
30 For all of India, urbanization rates for 1901, 1941, 1961, and 1991 were 10.8, 13.8, 18.0, and 25.7%, respectively 
(www.censusindia.net). In Tamilnad, Baker (1984) believes that urban data became more reliable after 1901. He 
finds four different patterns of urban development during the colonial period: in 1871-1891, the most important 
factor for town development was the government; in 1891-1911, they were cash-cropping and marketing; in 1911-
1931, commercial cropping; and in 1931-1951, industrial growth. 
31 The potential negative influence of rain on urbanization was mentioned in the 1931 census report (see Bose 
(1973, p.52)). 
32 Davis (1951, 12) writes: “These coasts, lying mostly in the torrid zone, are practically devoid of natural harbors. 
For much of their distance they are blocked by coastal islands and mangrove swamps. ‘The whole is storm-swept 
and scourged by fierce currents; there are hundreds of miles of bare rock-wall in the western half and of mangrove-
swamp in the eastern; the river harbours are amongst the most dangerous and expensive in the world...” 
  18  C. Population Density 
  For both the pre- and post-independence periods, the data exhibit little systematic 
relationship between population density and land tenures (Table 11). Even though non-landlord 
districts exhibited stronger economic outcomes, especially in the post-independence period, 
population density was no greater for non-landlord districts for the entire period between 1901 
and 1991. On the other hand, the data indicate that geographic factors were very important 
determinants of population density. Population density was higher in districts with lower 
altitudes, higher latitudes, alluvial and black soil. However, rainfall and coastal locations were 
not correlated with population density.
33
  D. Length of British Rule 
  The length of the British rule is negatively correlated with all our dependent variables 
indicating that the longevity of British rule in a district had a negative impact on its economic 
performance. While the coefficient on the length of British rule is statistically insignificant in 
many specifications, it is significant for population density, employment shares in services, 
agricultural productivity and food grain productivity. Since institutional stability is likely to be 
correlated with longevity of rule, this negative correlation suggests that British institutions did 
not have their intended effects. Indeed, agricultural productivity and industrial development 
remained stagnant during the British colonial period (Blyn (1966), Gadgil (1972), Roy (2000)). 
Despite the introduction of private property rights and a formal judicial system in India, 
differences in the race and culture of government officials and their subjects may have created 
poor incentives for the implementation of policies favorable for long-run development.
34
                                                 
33 It is interesting to note that many scholars such as Blyn (1966, p.134) attribute the geographic variation in 
population density to variations in rainfall. Surprisingly, at least by the twentieth century, we find little evidence that 
higher rainfall contributed to higher population density in India. 
34 Iyer (2004) finds that the “native states” which were under the administration of Indian rulers during the British 
  19  E. OLS Versus IV Estimates 
  In a majority of cases, the OLS and IV estimates generally give similar results. In a 
number of instances, however, the two estimates differ. The differences are most notable for pre-
independence regressions of agricultural productivity, food-grain productivity, and urbanization. 
Why do these estimates differ? We investigate the causes of these differences by comparing the 
non-landlord variable with Banerjee and Iyer’s instrument. In our sample, as seen in Appendix 
II, there are 49 non-landlord districts that are assigned as landlord in the IV specification because 
these districts were annexed prior to 1820; there is one landlord district that is assigned as non-
landlord because it was annexed after 1820.  
  Are the non-landlord districts annexed prior to 1820 a likely source of endogeneity bias? 
We do not believe so. What is striking is that most of these districts are from Madras and 
Bombay. In Madras, we believe that the non-landlord system developed by Read in 1792 and 
extended by Munro was not indigenous. Under the native Tipu Sultan, the land revenue system 
was based on tax-farming. Tipu Sultan leased extensive tracts of land to amildars who employed 
patels or headman to collect revenue preferably in shares (half of the produce). Mukherjee 
(1962) believes that Read invented the ryotwari system to eliminate the abuses of amildars and 
patels. Tax-farming based on share-cropping was likely to have been highly inefficient and Read 
and Munro probably realized that direct assessment of taxes on cultivators would improve both 
                                                                                                                                                             
colonial period had significantly higher investments in public goods such as schools, roads, and health centers than 
those annexed by the British in the post-independence period. She attributes these differences to the differences in 
the incentives faced by British administrators and native rulers. British colonial public investments in India were 
very low as well. Davis and Huttenback (1988, p. 101) write: “When all is said and done, [British] India spent on 
public works at a lower rate than the underdeveloped countries, and at a level similar to the Princely States. 
Moreover, unlike the other sectors, where expenditures rose over time, in India they peaked in the early 1880s and 
declined thereafter. As a percentage of the government’s budget, the Indian average was one-quarter higher than the 
figure for the underdeveloped countries, but only two-thirds of the average of the Princely States. Inclusion of 
railroads raises the Indian levels substantially. The same adjustment, however, pushes the foreign underdeveloped 
indices upward as well, and India’s relative position changes but little.” See Clark and Wolcott (2003) and Wolcott 
and Clark (1999) for a different perspective on the causes of Indian under-development. 
  20the incentives and conditions of cultivators. However, the development of the ryotwari system 
faced great resistance from other administrators. Read’s territory was converted to a zamindari 
system when he was forced to resign and return to England; Munro’s territory was re-organized 
under a village-lease system when he also returned to England. In the end, the decision to restore 
the ryotwari system in Madras came from the Court of Directors in England. The Directors, 
greatly impressed by Munro’s opinion and knowledge, pressed local administrators to restore the 
ryotwari system over their objections between 1814 and 1827 (Mukherjee (1962)). In Bombay, 
Stokes (1959) and Kumar (1968) argue that the ryotwari system spread as a product of a change 
in official British ideology, but Charlesworth (1985) suggests that local conditions also played an 
important role. 
  F. Robustness 
  Table 12 presents OLS panel regressions with year fixed-effects and standard errors 
adjusted for within-district correlation. We find that the non-landlord coefficient is positively 
significant for every dependent variable except for population density. When we cluster the 
standard errors by province, however, the level of significance declines somewhat (Table 13). 
Finally, when we examine the restricted sample of districts which share borders, the non-
landlord coefficient is no longer significant except for food grain productivity which is 
significant at the 13% level (Table 14). While the results of the restricted sample are troubling, 
we believe that the neighboring district sample is not randomly generated. Because tenants’ 
bargaining power increases with greater outside options, tenants in landlord districts that border 
non-landlord districts are likely to have greater bargaining power. Thus, landlord districts that 
border non-landlord districts may exhibit less systematic variation in their economies. 
 
  21IV. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we examine the impact of British colonial institutions on the economic 
development of pre- and post-independence India. In particular, we study the impact of two 
differing types of land tax revenue systems imposed in colonial India. In landlord areas, property 
rights in land and taxes were assigned to landlords who, in turn, set and collected taxes from 
cultivators; in non-landlord areas, the property rights and taxes were assigned directly to those 
who cultivated the land. Whereas Banerjee and Iyer (2005) examine the impact of what they call 
“institutional overhang” for the post-independence period, we investigate the impact of these 
institutions for the pre- and post-independence periods using a variety of measures of 
development. 
  Except for agricultural productivity and population density, we find that non-landlord 
areas seem to have outperformed landlord areas between 1901 and 1991. Non-landlord areas 
were more specialized in non-food crops which were likely to be more productive; non-landlord 
areas were also more urbanized than landlord areas. For the post-independence period for which 
the data are available, we find that non-landlord areas had greater shares of employment in 
manufacturing and services. In agricultural productivity, the patterns fluctuated over time. In 
1901, agricultural productivities of these areas were similar, but diverged in 1931. There is 
evidence of convergence between 1958-1961, but of divergence after 1961, and as shown in 
Banerjee and Iyer (2005), the divergence became more pronounced after 1965 with the advent of 
the Green Revolution. On the other hand, after controlling for geographic characteristics, land 
tenure systems had little impact on population density. 
  Due to the limitations of data, it is extremely difficult to determine the causes of 
divergence between landlord and non-landlord districts. However, because the political and 
  22economic conditions differed considerably between the pre- and post-independence periods, the 
examination of these two periods is likely to shed additional insights on the causes of divergence 
between these regions. In particular, Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) emphasis on the role of 
collective action costs and the importance of investments caused by the Green Revolution are 
unlikely to be important for the pre-independence period.  
  Among the potential causes of divergence outlined in our introduction, we believe that 
the most likely cause of divergence in the economies of landlord and non-landlord areas are 
likely to be related to agency costs and uncertainty in property rights. The fluctuations in 
agricultural productivities between landlord and non-landlord regions may, in part, be explained 
by the changing bargaining power of landlords and tenants. In the early years of the colonial 
period, when the British government typically intervened in favor of landlords, agricultural 
productivity of landlord areas may have been similar to non-landlord areas as landlords extracted 
significant levels of effort and rents from tenants through close monitoring, threat of eviction and 
extra-legal physical coercion.
35 As reforms were implemented to protect the rights of tenants, 
however, agency costs may have risen toward the latter period of British colonial rule leading to 
a relative decline in agricultural productivity in landlord areas.
36 Ironically, in the early years of 
the post-independence period, agricultural productivity of these regions may have converged as 
landlords re-acquired significant bargaining power over tenants in the new national 
government.
37 But as land reforms became more binding over time, the agricultural productivity 
                                                 
35 See Chatterjee (1984), Chaudhari (1984), Bose (1987), Shukla (1993), and Nakazato (1994). For differing views, 
see Ray (1979) and Panda (1996). Also see Stokes (1978) and Ludden (1984).  
36 Chaudhuri (1984) argues that rent reforms in Bengal, which restricted the ability of landlords to increase rents, 
contributed to lower levels of investments in the 1930s. Baker (1984) argues that landlords lost considerable 
bargaining power over their tenants during the first half of the twentieth century in Tamilnad. Yanagisawa (1996) 
also finds a gradual deterioration in the dominance of land ownership by members of higher castes in this region 
over time. 
37 Appu (1975) examines the post-independence tenancy legislations in detail. The First Plan of the Indian National 
Congress proposed ceiling limits on ownership by landlords with the idea that surplus land be given to tenants. The 
  23of landlord districts may have fallen relative to non-landlord districts as the increased bargaining 
position of tenants led to their reduced efforts.
38
  We also believe that greater uncertainty in property rights in landlord areas contributed to 
lower levels of agricultural investments and were likely factors responsible for the concentration 
of their agriculture in food crops, especially in paddy rice. Since a switch from food to non-food 
crops involves significant new investments in technology and a change in the organization of 
production, landlords may have been less willing to take on such a venture when their property 
rights status was more uncertain. In addition, a switch from traditional paddy rice to non-food 
crops probably increased the monitoring costs of tenants.
39 While it is difficult to assess the 
importance of property rights uncertainty, peasant revolts and tenancy reforms are testaments to 
the perceived illegitimacy of landlord property rights. Because the proprietary rights given to 
landlords by the British colonial government differed markedly from tradition and history, these 
rights never attained full social legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
enactment of these reforms, however, was left to state discretion and was voluntary. Subsequent Second and Third 
Five Year Plans attempted to improve on the first plan, but these reforms were generally seen as failures. During this 
period, it appears that landlords had great discretion in their ability to evict tenants at will. Insecurity of property 
rights, however, probably contributed to the failure to invest in new crop varieties. Fourth Five Year Plan reports: “It 
has been observed that under the present arrangement of informal tenancy and share-cropping, the landlord 
considers it unwise to invest in improving his land; likewise, the share-cropper or the tenant is either unable or 
reluctant to invest in inputs like fertilisers. The insecurity of tenancy has not only impeded the widespread adoption 
of the high-yielding varieties but in some cases led to social and agrarian tensions (Appu (1975, p. 1347)).” Also see 
Frankel and Rao (1989, 1990), Brass (1994), Brown (1994) and Frankel (2005).  
38 Besley and Burgess (2000) find that tenancy reforms in post-independence India between 1958 and 1992 lowered 
poverty levels but did so at the expense of efficiency. They find that land reforms lowered agricultural productivity 
and they believe that this decline was likely caused by a fall in bargaining power of landlords over tenants due to 
tenancy reforms. Boyce (1987) argues that tenancy reforms also lowered landlord investments in irrigation. Because 
irrigation was an important complement to investments in new technology, he believes that tenancy reforms 
hindered the adoption of new agricultural technologies in the historically landlord areas. On the other hand, Banerjee 
et. al. (2002) find that tenancy reform implemented in West Bengal in the late 1970s were associated with an 
increase in rice yields between 1984 and 1993. 
39 The valleys in Tamilnad, according to Baker (1984, 170-172), were concentrated in paddy rice and were 
controlled by landlords who used sharecropping or a system of tied labor (indenture) arrangements to cultivate the 
land. Baker argues that the optimal scale of paddy rice under flush irrigation was about 1-4 acres involving one 
plough-team consisting of two men and two buffaloes or cattle. Landlords carefully controlled and monitored the 
growing of crops and restricted the cultivation of crops which depleted the soil. Because paddy rice involved the 
inundation of fields, it was difficult to complement paddy rice with other crops, especially those requiring good 
drainage conditions. 
  24  Economic development in landlord areas was likely to have been hindered as landlords 
had incentives to reduce the economic mobility of tenants and laborers in landlord regions. As 
shown in Banerjee et. al. (2002), a landlord’s bargaining power over tenants increased as outside 
options of tenants declined. Given these incentives, it is not surprising that landlord regions were 
much less urbanized than non-landlord regions as cities often provided alternative forms of 
employment for tenants. Landlords also had little incentives to foster the geographic mobility of 
tenants and laborers as their immobility lowered their bargaining position. While reasons as to 
why geographic mobility remained extremely low in India are complex, our findings on 
population density indicate little geographic movement from poorly performing landlord districts 
to the more productive non-landlord districts.
40
  The British colonial institutions imposed in India have had a profound impact on its 
development. In landlord areas, where the British government gave proprietary rights to few 
landlords, political and legal institutions were used for the benefit of the few as compared to non-
landlord areas where property rights were given to cultivators. These differences led to a 
significant divergence in their economies. Yet, the impact of British colonial institutions in India 
goes beyond the important issue of land tenures. Even in non-landlord areas, where property 
rights were granted to cultivators and were enforced by a formal judicial system, the record of 
economic progress remained bleak for centuries. Why the introduction of western institutions in 
India, which eventually led to the adoption of democratic institutions after its independence, did 
not contribute to economic development for such a long time remains a puzzle to be explored.
41
 
                                                 
40 Collins (1999) finds little evidence of labor mobility in late nineteenth century India. Despite the fact that 
transportation improvements may have led to regional convergence in prices, Collins finds little evidence of 
corresponding regional wage convergence at the district level. Also see Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005). 
41 It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the enormous literature on the impact of British colonialism on 
Indian economic development. We refer the reader to Roy (2000, 2002) for references and perspectives on this 
subject. 
  25  Appendix I: Pre-independence Agricultural Productivity and Acreage Estimates 
 
  We construct data on agricultural productivity and acreage at the district level for the pre-independence 
period (1901-1902, 1931-1932) using official published government documents: Agricultural Statistics of India and 
Season & Crop Reports. 
  We consider a major subset of crops produced in India. This subset currently occupies more than two thirds 
of the total output value from the crop sector and more than a half of the total output from agriculture. In terms of 
acreage, these crops account for almost 80-90% of total cultivation. As in Blyn (1966), the crops are divided into 
two categories: food grains and non-food grains. The food grain crops include rice wheat, barley, jowar (sorghum), 
bajra (pearl millet), maize, ragi (finger millet), gram (chickpea), other food grains including pulses;  non-food grains 
include linseed, sesamum, rape and mustard, groundnut, sugarcane, tea, coffee, tobacco, cotton, and jute. For most 
of these crops, sufficient and continuous data are available for our period of study.  
       Prices in pounds per acre for various crops were derived from prices per ton figures from Blyn (1966). These 
prices are weighted averages of the provincial harvest prices during 1924/25-28/29 for different crops with weights 
proportional to the area under the crop in the individual provinces. Prices during this period were fairly stable and 
free from unusual influence of wars or foreign trade conditions. District level crop prices are difficult to construct 
due to numerous missing and unreported data.  
 
A Agricultural  Productivity 
  Agricultural productivity (rupees per acre) is measured as total output in rupees divided by total cultivated 
area in acres. The calculation for a given district of aggregate agricultural productivity is based on the following 
formula: Agricultural Productivity = Σj  (Yield in pounds per acre of crop j)*(Price in pounds per acre of crop j) * 
(Area sown under the crop j/ Total area sown in the district aggregated over all crops in the district). 
  Although yield information is available for most crops, we encountered many challenges in constructing 
district level agricultural productivity. We refer the reader to Blyn (1966) who faced similar challenges for the 
construction of output and productivity data at the provincial level. We outline some of the problems: (1) In 
aggregating the yield of irrigated and un-irrigated areas, the corresponding proportion of irrigated and un-irrigated 
acreage data for some of the crops were not reported. In these cases, we used the proportion of the total irrigated and 
un-irrigated sown area in the district as weights. (2) In aggregating the yield of broadcast and transplanted rice, the 
corresponding acreage shares under the two kinds of rice were not reported. We used a simple arithmetic average of 
the two kinds of rice yields to get an average yield of rice. (3) In aggregating the yield for crops classified as Bhadoi, 
Kharif and Rabi crops (autumn, winter and summer crops), we used the acreage share under each category from the 
Season and Crop Report; (4) For some of the crops such as tea, coffee, tobacco and groundnut, where many yield 
figures at the district level were missing, we used the respective national averages calculated by Sivasubramonian 
(1960); (5) In a small number of cases, the yield values were approximated using information from neighboring 
years and districts. 
  For 1931, we provide a comparison of our agricultural productivity estimates with those of Blyn. To make 
the comparison comparable, we aggregated our values from the district to the provincial level. It is important to 
note, however, that our province definition does not match completely with those of Blyn. For Bengal, Blyn’s 
definition also includes present day Bangladesh; for Bombay, Blyn’s definition includes Sind; for Punjab, Blyn 
includes Delhi and the Northwest Frontier province. For Madras, Central Province, and Bombay, our definition 
overlaps closely with those of Blyn’s. In addition, there are a few differences in our coverage of crops from that of 
Blyn. Unlike Blyn, we include coffee and other food-grains but exclude indigo. Data are in rupees per acre. 
____________________________________________ 
Agricultural Productivity, 1931   
____________________________________________ 
Province    Our’s     Blyn’s 
Bengal    73.1   64.5 
Bombay    37.2   50.0 
Central  Provinces   32.2   32.8 
Madras    66.2   65.3 
Punjab    39.3   51.7 




  26B. Agricultural  Acreage 
  Whereas agricultural productivity estimates are based on 18 major crops, data on acreage are based on all 
crops and are much more comprehensive and reliable. We compare our acreage data with those of Blyn in the table 
below. Data are in million acres. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Acreage, 1901    All Crops    Food Crops    Non-Food Crops 
Province    Our’s    Blyn’s   Our’s    Blyn’s   Our’s    Blyn’s 
Bengal      41.1 49.0   34.6 41.9   6.5  7.1 
Bombay      19.7 22.8   18.4 18.7   1.2  4.1 
Central  Provinces    20.0 19.0   15.0 13.6   5.0  5.4 
Madras      28.2 26.1   23.3 22.5   4.9  3.6 
Punjab        7.1  17.2   4.1  14.8   3.1  2.4 
United  Province    41.8 36.2   30.2 36.5   5.3  5.8 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Acreage, 1931    All Crops    Food Crops    Non-Food Crops 
Province    Our’s    Blyn’s   Our’s    Blyn’s   Our’s    Blyn’s 
Bengal      36.5 48.9   32.0 43.3   4.5  5.6 
Bombay      29.1 26.5   19.9 20.4   9.2  6.1 
Central  Provinces    24.2 21.2   17.8 14.9   6.4  6.3 
Madras      32.0 27.6   24.6 21.6   7.4  6.0 
Punjab    10.5  26.9   7.6  22.7   2.9  4.2 
United  Province    42.0 38.7   37.2 31.2   4.9  7.5 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Appendix II: Differences in Land Tenure Status Between the OLS and IV Specifications  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
A. List of non-landlord districts that are assigned as landlord by Banerjee and Iyer’s instrument 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Bombay Province 
Ahmadabad, Ahmadnagar, Belgaum, Bijapur, Broach , Dharwar, Kaira, Kanara, Khandesh, Kolaba, Nasik, Pancha 
Mahals, Poona, Ratnagiri, Satara, Sholapur, Surat, Thana 
 
Madras Province 
Anantapur, Bellary, Chingleput, Coimbatore, Cuddapah, Godavari, Kistna, Nellore, Nilgiris, North Arcot, 
Pudukottai, Salem, South Arcot, South Kanara, Tanjore, Tinnevelly, Trichinopoly 
 
Northwest Province 











Note: For this table, a district was defined as a non-landlord district if more than half of the district came non-
landlord organization. Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) instrument takes on a value of 1 (non-landlord) if the area came 
under British rule between 1820 and 1856 and zero (landlord) otherwise. 
 
  27     Table 1 
 
    Geographic Distribution of Land-Tenure Systems in Colonial India 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Type of Tenure    Percentage  Province where it was prevalent 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Landlord      
  zamindari    57%    Bengal, Bihar & Orissa, parts of Madras and United Province   
 
Non-landlord 
  ryotwari    38%    Madras, Bombay & Assam, parts of Central Province 
  mahalwari      5%    Punjab, parts of Central Province and Orissa 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 




     Table 2 
 
  Summary  Statistics  of  Geographic  Variables: Mean values (standard deviation) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
   All  Districts   Landlord Non-Landlord  Differences 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Latitude    21.99  (5.9)   23.80   20.44             3.28* 
     
Altitude    433.77  (522.3)   327.7   523.58   -161.37* 
     
Rainfall  (mm)   1225.35  (436.8)   1346.0   1123.1     191.42* 
     
Coastal dummy    0.18 (0.39)    0.13    0.24        -0.17* 
     
Black soil dummy  0.21 (0.41)    0.13    0.27        -0.16* 
    
Alluvial soil dummy  0.57 (0.50)    0.58    0.56          0.05 
     
Red soil dummy    0.17 (0.38)    0.24    0.12          0.08 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: *Difference in means between landlord and non-landlord districts significant at 5% level. Latitude is degrees 
North; altitude is meters above sea level; rainfall is the 30 year average of mean annual rainfall between 1930 and 
1961. For this table, a district is considered as landlord if the percentage of land tenures in the district organized as 
















  28     Table 3 
 
  Summary  Statistics  of  Dependent Variables: Mean values 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
      1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1961 1971 1981 1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Agricultural Productivity     
      All  Districts    54.76  - - 56.57  - 147.44  - 844.72  - 
      Landlord    51.97  - - 54.35  - 146.97  - 831.48  - 
      Non-landlord    57.12  - - 58.37  - 147.57  - 848.29  - 
  Difference                        -5.13      -             -              -4.02     -              -19.47    -           160.44*   - 
 
Non-Food Acreage (%)     
   All Districts    18.7  - - 19.7  - 19.0  - 20.0  - 
   Landlord    15.0  -  - 14.0  - 14.0  - 15.0  - 
      Non-landlord    22.0  - - 24.0  - 22.0  - 24.0  - 
  Difference                        -7.0*     -             -            -10.5*     -               -8.0 *    -              9.0*        - 
 
Urbanization  (%)     
      All  Districts    9.7  11.5 11.2 13.6 14.0 16.0 17.4 20.3 22.1 
   Landlord    5.0    9.0    8.0    9.0  13.0  13.0  14.0 20.0 19.0 
   Non-landlord    13.3  14.0        13.8 14.0 17.0 19.0 17.0 23.0 25.0 
   Difference                       -8.0*       -5.0*     -5.8*       -5.0*      -4.0*      -6.0*      -6.0*      -5.8*      -6.0* 
 
Manufacturing Empl. (%) 
      All  Districts    - - - - - 3.5  4.4  6.0  10.7 
      Landlord    - - - - - 3.0  3.0  4.0      9.0 
      Non-landlord    - - - - - 4.0  5.0  7.0  11.0 
   Difference                       -             -             -             -             -            -1.4*       -2.3*      -2.3*        -2.3* 
 
Services Empl. (%) 
      All  Districts    - - - - - 15.6  14.5  14.8  18.6 
      Landlord    - - - - - 15.0  13.0  13.0  17.0 
      Non-landlord    - - - - - 17.0  16.0  16.0  20.0 
   Difference                       -             -             -             -             -              -1.9        -2.7*      -2.7*      -3.4* 
 
Population Density   
      All  Districts   402.7 351.8 343.5 385.4 441.3 569.1 693.1 858.0 1141.1 
      Landlord    407.2 404.0 387.2 409.9 491.4 627.8 765.6 950.7 1296.9 
      Non-landlord    395.3 304.1 302.5 357.3 394.3 507.5 617.0 760.7     968.3 
   Difference                         11.6*   100.0 *    84.7       52.6       97.1      120.2*    148.5*   189.0*     328.6* 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: *Difference in means between landlord and non-landlord districts significant at 5% level. Agricultural 
productivity is measured in rupees per acre. Population density is persons per square miles. The number of 











  29     Table 4 
 
   Agricultural  Productivity,  1901-1981 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1901 1901 1931 1931 1961 1961 1971 1971 1981 1981 
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  8.42  -10.82 12.81* -7.92  12.14  50.54  69.50* 242.9* 223.2* 495.47 
    (1.44) (0.55) (2.40) (0.93) (1.08) (1.55) (2.06) (2.10) (2.45) (1.89) 
 
Length  of    -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.06 -0.60* -0.71* -1.70* -2.19* -3.16* -3.93* 
British  Rule  (1.78) (1.57) (1.69) (0.89) (2.86) (2.68) (2.80) (2.82) (2.12) (2.33) 
 
Altitude    -0.01  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10*  0.07 0.04*  0.29 1.04*  0.84 
    (0.76) (0.05) (0.03) (0.82) (2.45) (1.36) (3.16) (1.65) (2.96) (1.96) 
 
Latitude    2.38  1.89  -0.29 -0.90 -2.84 -1.71 -0.19 3.21  -3.85 4.15 
    (1.27) (1.22) (0.31) (0.78) (1.65) (0.90) (0.46) (0.62) (0.40) (0.36) 
 
Coastal    38.06 10.27 -0.57 2.22  36.30 32.95 102.1 86.96 178.9 155.17 
    (1.62) (1.55) (0.06) (0.24) (1.71) (1.43) (1.84) (1.38) (1.45) (1.12) 
 
Rainfall    -0.00 -0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.04* 0.04* 0.05  0.08  0.06  0.11 
    (0.24) (0.40) (3.20) (2.22) (2.08) (2.25) (1.36) (1.73) (0.76) (1.11) 
 
Black  soil  25.23  26.68  -16.44  -15.44  -43.65* -43.49* -94.11* -93.37  -258.59*  -257.43* 
    (0.94) (0.92) (1.51) (1.36) (2.49) (2.33) (2.39) (1.94) (2.48) (2.29) 
 
Alluvial  soil  11.48 14.59 1.86  4.96  13.06 7.56  35.01 10.16 104.21  65.20 
    (0.96) (0.98) (0.33) (0.93) (0.74) (0.43) (0.91) (0.26) (1.13) (0.69) 
 
Red  soil    27.23* 24.55* 8.58  6.27  50.90* 52.28* 111.46 117.67 281.08*  290.84* 
    (2.52) (2.65) (1.14) (0.84) (2.40) (2.45) (1.98) (1.97) (2.26) (2.26) 
 
Constant    255.09  216.69  239.92  170.67  1199.9* 1357.4* 3216.8* 3927.9* 6093.2* 7209.9* 
    (1.88) (1.69) (1.93) (1.39) (3.18) (2.95) (2.89) (2.87) (2.29) (2.42) 
 
Observations 115 115 118 118 105 105 105 105 105 105 
R-squared  0.224 0.190 0.278 0.178 0.477 0.437 0.388 0.262 0.392 0.337 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: * significant at 5%. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Agricultural productivity is in 















  30     Table 5 
 
    Annual Post-Independence Agricultural Productivity, 1958-1965 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1958 1958 1959 1959 1960 1960 1961 1961 1962 1962 
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  4.30  32.69 11.04 62.19*  15.65 44.12 12.15 50.54 17.40 77.75* 
    (0.45) (1.17) (1.05) (2.26) (1.28) (1.34) (1.08) (1.55) (1.38) (2.11) 
 
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
R-squared  0.393 0.356 0.488 0.393 0.401 0.378 0.477 0.437 0.438 0.347 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1963 1963 1964 1964 1965 1965 
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)   
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  33.61 114.75*  33.98 31.11 49.63*  87.26  
    (1.94) (2.22) (1.63) (0.55) (2.43) (1.29)  
 
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105  
R-squared  0.419 0.319 0.334 0.334 0.485 0.471  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: * significant at 5%. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. These regressions contain the 

































  31     Table 6 
 
   Food  Grain  Productivity,  1901-1981 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1901 1901 1931 1931 1961 1961 1971 1971 1981 1981 
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord 0.48 0.96 4.34 -6.22  9.07 111.53*  39.49  340.72*  131.7  777.62* 
    (0.14) (0.09) (1.74) (1.11) (0.94) (2.81) (1.27) (2.47) (1.83) (2.61) 
 
Length  of    -0.12 -0.12 -0.01 0.02  -0.30 -0.59*  -0.90 -1.76*  -1.07 -2.91 
British  Rule  (1.74) (1.86) (0.25) (0.31) (1.66) (2.32) (1.61) (2.28) (0.82) (1.65) 
 
Altitude    -0.02 -0.02 -0.02*  -0.01 0.06  -0.01 0.29* 0.07  0.61* 0.14 
    (1.74) (1.33) (2.84) (1.38) (1.81) (0.22) (2.56) (0.39) (2.30) (0.36) 
 
Latitude    0.70 0.71 0.56 0.25 -4.06*  -1.05  -5.77  3.09 -12.05  6.94 
    (1.88) (1.52) (1.83) (0.71) (2.37) (0.48) (1.39) (0.50) (1.27) (0.53) 
 
Coastal    15.04* 14.99* 12.19* 13.61* 47.96*  39.02 81.07 54.78 142.47  86.11 
    (3.94) (3.70) (3.38) (3.36) (2.32) (1.55) (1.52) (0.83) (1.15) (0.57) 
 
Rainfall    0.011*  0.011*  0.01*  0.01*  0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.01  0.12 
    (3.40) (2.91) (3.61) (2.88) (1.16) (1.76) (0.18) (1.25) (0.07) (1.05) 
 
Black  soil  1.98  1.95  -1.25  -0.74  -34.20 -33.76 -100.33*  -99.04 -234.92*  -232.15 
    (0.54) (0.50) (0.41) (0.23) (1.96) (1.46) (2.62) (1.66) (2.38) (1.67) 
 
Alluvial  soil  3.22 3.15 7.82*  9.40*  9.87 -4.81  46.93  3.77 171.89  79.32 
    (0.77) (0.67) (2.48) (2.92) (0.61) (0.26) (1.25) (0.09) (1.84) (0.76) 
 
Red  soil    12.48* 12.53* 8.31*  7.14*  63.26* 66.93* 126.51*  137.31*  341.51*  364.66* 
    (2.22) (2.06) (2.58) (2.10) (3.06) (2.90) (2.32) (2.16) (2.58) (2.45) 
 
Constant    227.16  228.64* 41.39  6.09  703.60* 1123.9* 1923.8  3159.4* 2608.3  5257.8 
    (1.91) (2.03) (0.53) (0.07) (2.11) (2.50) (1.82) (2.32) (1.07) (1.68) 
 
Observations 116 116 118 118 105 105 105 105 105 105 
R-squared  0.436 0.435 0.521 0.456 0.508 0.212 0.342 -  0.370 0.004 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: * significant at 5%. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Food grain productivity is in 















  32     Table 7 
 
   Non-Food  Grain  Acreage  Share,  1901-1981 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1901 1901 1931 1931 1961 1961 1971 1971 1981 1981 
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  6.06* 34.0* 11.26*  23.47*  7.13* 15.76 5.88  15.22 4.99  7.08 
    (2.21) (3.21) (3.58) (3.28) (2.47) (1.73) (1.94) (1.66) (1.61) (0.74) 
 
Length  of    -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
British  Rule  (0.61) (1.75) (0.48) (1.20) (0.53) (1.04) (0.56) (1.11) (1.24) (1.51) 
 
Altitude    0.03* 0.008 0.03* 0.02* 0.02* 0.001 0.02* 0.01  0.02* 0.02 
    (4.00) (0.60) (3.73) (2.10) (2.17) (0.94) (2.12) (0.97) (2.03) (1.45) 
 
Latitude    0.57 1.35*  -0.09  0.26 0.05 0.30 -0.21  0.06 -0.15  -0.09 
    (1.57) (2.88) (0.25) (0.63) (0.14) (0.73) (0.58) (0.14) (0.44) (0.21) 
 
Coastal    4.64 1.06 2.52 0.91 4.31 3.56 4.11 3.29 5.29 5.11 
    (1.20) (0.22) (0.66) (0.24) (1.09) (0.88) (0.99) (0.79) (1.40) (1.33) 
 
Rainfall   -0.009* -0.004  -0.008* -0.006* -0.013* -0.011* -0.014* -0.012* -0.011* -0.011* 
    (3.54) (0.99) (3.98) (2.49) (4.56) (3.18) (4.99) (3.51) (4.10) (3.29) 
 
Black  soil  6.84 5.42 7.70 7.06 7.96 8.00 5.59 5.63 1.38 1.39 
    (1.53) (1.09) (1.63) (1.54) (1.87) (1.94) (1.15) (1.20) (0.32) (0.32) 
 
Alluvial  soil  1.84 -2.33  0.44 -1.29  3.72 2.48 2.09 0.75 -1.24  -1.54 
    (0.81) (0.71) (0.18) (0.47) (1.37) (0.82) (0.76) (0.25) (0.49) (0.55) 
 
Red  soil    8.07*  11.01*  5.10 6.31 2.99 3.30 2.01 2.34 2.02 2.09 
    (2.65) (2.49) (1.61) (1.76) (0.94) (0.94) (0.62) (0.66) (0.64) (0.65) 
 
Constant    35.10 126.57  42.48 85.26 51.51 86.93 64.41 102.71  116.07  124.64 
    (0.59) (1.46) (0.71) (1.24) (0.72) (1.13) (0.88) (1.31) (1.51) (1.80) 
 
Observations 117 117 116 116 105 105 105 105 105 105 
R-squared  0.331 -  0.487 0.392 0.385 0.329 0.378 0.316 0.293 0.290 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
















  33     Table 8 
 
    Urbanization,  1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1901 1901 1911 1911 1921 1921 1931 1931 1941 1941 
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  10.64*  105.8 8.00* -9.13 5.31* -0.98 3.02  -1.50 5.53* 1.60 
    (2.28) (0.66) (2.98) (0.82) (2.96) (0.22) (1.21) (0.31) (2.26) (0.28) 
 
Length of   -0.03  -0.40  0.007  0.05  -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
British  Rule  (0.59) (0.65) (0.12) (0.55) (1.46) (0.74) (0.67) (0.23) (0.95) (0.69) 
 
Altitude    -0.02 -0.20 -0.004*  -0.0002  -0.002 -0.0003  -0.001 -0.0001  -0.003 -0.002 
    (1.45) (0.65) (2.11) (0.10) (1.58) (0.21) (0.79) (0.07) (1.72) (0.93) 
 
Latitude    -0.78 0.44  0.32  -0.15 0.11  -0.06 -0.12 -0.25 0.24  0.14 
    (2.07) (0.19) (1.09) (0.44) (0.51) (0.23) (0.50) (0.89) (2.48) (0.43) 
 
Coastal    -5.22*  -9.21 -0.52 0.95  0.01  0.70  -2.04 -1.54 -0.65 -0.28 
    (2.24) (0.67) (0.22) (0.26) (0.00) (0.26) (0.83) (0.59) (0.20) (0.08) 
 
Rainfall    0.002 0.021 -0.005*  -0.007*  -0.005* -0.006* -0.007* -0.007* -0.008* -0.008* 
    (0.49) (0.59) (2.90) (3.01) (3.12) (3.11) (3.54) (3.57) (2.92) (2.80) 
 
Black  soil  -1.12  -3.42  4.47 6.18 3.27 3.70 2.53 2.83 4.85 5.31 
    (0.39) (0.24) (1.23) (1.15) (1.39) (1.48) (1.10) (1.17) (1.67) (1.73) 
 
Alluvial  soil  0.32  -13.49  3.17  6.07* 2.97  3.92* 5.14* 5.82* 3.65  4.27 
    (0.15) (0.55) (1.59) (2.28) (1.71) (2.06) (2.55) (2.78) (1.72) (1.87) 
 
Red  soil    -2.05 15.69 3.55  -0.19 -1.89 -3.11 -2.04 -2.92 0.83  -0.11 
    (1.01) (0.49) (0.95) (0.05) (1.11) (1.69) (1.14) (1.54) (0.43) (0.05) 
 
Constant   86.26  693.60  -6.90  -62.83  88.09 63.96 57.61 40.29 74.43 66.10 
    (0.87) (0.43) (0.07) (0.42) (1.69) (1.10) (1.05) (0.64) (1.18) (0.99) 
 
Observations 31  31  122 122 121 121 121 121 113 113 
R-squared  0.581 -  0.141 -  0.235 0.153 0.198 0.164 0.223 0.201 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
















  34    Table 8 - continued 
 
    Urbanization,  1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1961 1961 1971 1971 1981 1981 1991 1991  
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)   
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord 4.46 6.86 4.87 7.51 5.46 7.20 5.54 7.20  
    (1.56) (1.14) (1.61) (1.22) (1.74) (1.11) (1.66) (0.98) 
 
Length of   -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04  
British  Rule  (0.51) (0.63) (0.75) (0.85) (0.99) (0.99) (0.58) (0.60)  
 
Altitude    -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004  
    (1.13) (1.35) (1.08) (1.34) (1.28) (1.39) (1.45) (1.50)  
 
Latitude    -0.03 0.04  -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01  
    (0.09) (0.13) (0.34) (0.11) (0.31) (0.16) (0.17) (0.03)  
 
Coastal    0.01  -0.20 -0.09 -0.32 -0.98 -1.14 -0.71 -0.56  
    (0.00) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.24) (0.27) (0.16) (0.12)  
 
Rainfall   -0.008* -0.008* -0.009* -0.008* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009*  
    (2.92) (2.70) (2.93) (2.71) (2.72) (2.55) (2.75) (2.55)  
 
Black  soil  5.29 5.23 5.10 5.03 3.37 3.33 2.29 2.22  
    (1.61) (1.58) (1.47) (1.44) (0.94) (0.92) (0.62) (0.60)  
 
Alluvial  soil  4.75 4.41 5.10 4.73 4.72 4.48 4.63 4.40  
    (1.92) (1.73) (1.97) (1.79) (1.81) (1.67) (1.65) (1.50)  
 
Red  soil    0.63 1.05 0.30 0.76 -1.68  -1.38  -1.47  -1.17   
    (0.28) (0.42) (0.13) (0.29) (0.64) (0.49) (0.52) (0.38)  
 
Constant    60.87 73.04 84.72 98.08 110.20  119.02  85.73 95.54  
    (0.81) (0.89) (1.08) (1.15) (1.37) (1.35) (0.92) (0.90)  
 
Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 125 125  
R-squared  0.188 0.182 0.201 0.194 0.183 0.180 0.162 0.160  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
















  35     Table 9 
 
   Manufacturing  Employment  Share,  1961-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1961 1961 1971 1971 1981 1981 1991 1991  
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)   
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  1.76* 4.15* 2.47* 4.54  3.03* 5.29* 2.06  5.31   
    (2.05) (2.10) (2.57) (1.94) (2.76) (2.05) (1.24) (1.55) 
 
Length of   -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04  
British  Rule  (1.07) (1.30) (0.92) (1.17) (1.52) (1.73) (1.26) (1.55)  
 
Altitude    -0.001 -0.001*  -0.001 -0.001* -0.001  -0.002* 0.001  0.000   
    (1.55) (2.45) (1.53) (2.06) (1.54) (2.07) (1.15) (0.39)  
 
Latitude    -0.14  0.21*  0.09 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.09  
    (1.31) (2.05) (0.80) (1.26) (1.26) (1.69) (0.00) (0.45)  
 
Coastal    1.28 1.08 1.68 1.50 1.86 1.67 1.90 1.62  
    (0.82) (0.65) (1.03) (0.87) (1.07) (0.91) (0.90) (0.73)  
 
Rainfall    -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
    (1.34) (1.08) (1.60) (1.34) (1.14) (0.93) (0.41) (0.25)  
 
Black  soil  1.16 1.06 0.79 0.70 1.00 0.90 1.33 1.19  
    (1.57) (1.24) (0.83) (0.68) (1.00) (0.82) (0.93) (0.78)  
 
Alluvial  soil  2.16* 1.83* 2.20* 1.92* 2.40* 2.09* 3.66* 3.21*  
    (3.64) (2.64) (1.97) (2.50) (2.87) (2.31) (2.84) (2.39)  
 
Red  soil    0.77 1.21 0.86 1.23 0.94 1.35 2.77 3.36  
    (0.87) (1.28) (0.94) (1.21) (0.90) (1.15) (1.54) (1.76)  
 
Constant    28.71 39.91 26.93 36.59 46.69 57.27 61.79 77.03  
    (1.05) (1.24) (0.98) (1.19) (1.54) (1.72) (1.44) (1.69)  
 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125  
R-squared  0.157 0.104 0.188 0.155 0.185 0.154 0.141 0.110  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
















  36     Table 10 
 
   Service  Employment  Share,  1961-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1961 1961 1971 1971 1981 1981 1991 1991  
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)   
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  4.17* 11.00*  3.63* 8.93  3.93* 9.74* 4.40* 11.09*   
    (2.33) (2.48) (2.10) (1.98) (2.42) (2.26) (2.33) (2.24) 
 
Length of   -0.05  -0.07*  -0.03  -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04  
British  Rule  (1.61) (2.23) (0.97) (1.39) (0.82) (1.28) (0.59) (1.11)  
 
Altitude   -0.002  -0.003* 0.0001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001  -0.000  
    (1.10) (2.16) (0.08) (0.76) (0.53) (1.61) (0.78) (0.31)  
 
Latitude    0.52* 0.71* 0.38  0.53* 0.45* 0.62* 0.52* 0.71*  
    (2.50) (3.08) (1.98) (2.59) (2.69) (3.25) (2.66) (3.22)  
 
Coastal    2.86 2.26 3.34 2.88 4.37*  3.86 5.51*  4.93*   
    (1.42) (1.00) (1.83) (1.42) (2.44) (1.92) (2.59) (2.05)  
 
Rainfall   -0.003* -0.003  -0.003* -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  
    (2.44) (1.64) (2.06) (1.54) (1.88) (1.30) (1.43) (0.88)  
 
Black  soil  -0.39  -0.69  0.54 0.32 0.70 0.45 -0.06  -0.35   
    (0.20) (0.31) (0.29) (0.15) (0.42) (0.24) (0.03) (0.16)  
 
Alluvial  soil  2.02 1.07 1.84 1.11 1.59 0.79 0.97 0.05  
    (1.17) (0.54) (0.94) (0.54) (0.94) (0.41) (0.52) (0.02)  
 
Red  soil    3.86*  5.10*  2.36 3.32 1.92 2.98 1.72 2.93  
    (2.46) (2.63) (1.63) (1.80) (1.38) (1.65) (1.04) (1.39)  
 
Constant    88.44 120.5*  57.57 82.38 47.37 74.56 39.98 71.32  
    (1.72) (2.26) (1.08) (1.43) (0.90) (1.29) (0.68) (1.11)  
 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125  
R-squared  0.185 0.078 0.136 0.065 0.159 0.064 0.174 0.077  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
















  37     Table 11 
 
    Population  Density,  1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1901 1901 1911 1911 1921 1921 1931 1931 1941 1941 
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  87.35 80.77 -10.71  -46.54  8.50  -25.35  61.73 47.63 26.34 30.94 
    (1.70) (0.78) (0.26) (0.57) (0.20) (0.34) (1.40) (0.58) (0.50) (0.28) 
 
Length  of    -0.28 -0.28 -0.67 -0.60 -0.45 -0.39 -0.16 -0.15 -0.83 -0.83 
British  Rule  (0.40) (0.39) (0.93) (0.76) (0.62) (0.50) (0.24) (0.21) (0.97) (0.91) 
 
Altitude    -0.45* -0.45* -0.09* -0.08* -0.09* -0.08* -0.35* -0.34* -0.11* -0.11* 
    (4.04) (3.46) (2.88) (2.56) (2.92) (2.69) (3.24) (2.64) (3.40) (3.08) 
 
Latitude    13.94* 13.75* 10.79* 9.78*  9.91*  9.05*  12.22* 11.79* 14.06* 14.17* 
    (2.33) (2.09) (2.52) (2.20) (2.19) (1.98) (2.36) (2.12) (2.48) (2.38) 
 
Coastal    19.76 20.23 31.55 33.58 33.32 36.79 18.25 19.66 -24.59  -25.01 
    (0.29) (0.29) (0.61) (0.65) (0.61) (0.67) (0.29) (0.31) (0.40) (0.40) 
 
Rainfall    0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 
    (0.98) (0.97) (0.77) (0.67) (0.63) (0.53) (1.24) (1.20) (0.07) (0.08) 
 
Black  soil  -13.88 -14.46 -17.87 -14.22 -4.67  -1.63  11.19  10.57  17.09  16.55 
    (0.22) (0.23) (0.40) (0.31) (0.10) (0.04) (0.22) (0.21) (0.32) (0.30) 
 
Alluvial soil  159.47* 160.39* 140.82* 146.89* 151.85* 157.25* 184.30* 185.87* 226.70* 225.97* 
    (3.09) (3.15) (3.14) (3.30) (3.36) (3.58) (3.93) (4.05) (4.22) (4.24) 
 
Red  soil    0.89  -0.24 77.34 69.15 88.88 80.77 70.88 68.58 135.36*  136.46* 
    (0.01) (0.00) (1.56) (1.41) (1.71) (1.64) (1.29) (1.28) (2.05) (2.06) 
 
Constant    556.74 557.17 1246.7 1145.9 842.15 772.13 324.85 307.44 1501.3 1511.0 
    (0.43) (0.43) (0.97) (0.85) (0.64) (0.56) (0.27) (0.25) (0.98) (0.94) 
 
Observations 93  93  120 120 115 115 106 106 113 113 
R-squared  0.457 0.457 0.398 0.394 0.388 0.384 0.443 0.443 0.434 0.434 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
















  38      Table 11 - continued 
 
    Population  Density,  1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1961 1961 1971 1971 1981 1981 1991 1991  
  (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)    (OLS) (IV)  (OLS) (IV)   
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  28.38 18.43 34.92 49.12 50.98 36.03 61.47 189.77   
    (0.47) (0.16) (0.49) (0.34) (0.58) (0.20) (0.51) (0.76) 
 
Length of   -2.12  -2.08  -2.97*  -3.02  -3.77* -3.72  -7.17* -7.58*  
British  Rule  (1.84) (1.51) (2.14) (1.78) (2.19) (1.79) (2.53) (2.17)  
 
Altitude    -0.16* 0.16*  -0.19* -0.20* -0.24* -0.24* -0.34* -0.38*  
    (3.62) (3.40) (3.71) (3.48) (3.80) (3.52) (3.75) (3.67)  
 
Latitude    16.01* 15.73* 20.56* 20.96* 27.93* 27.51* 39.45* 43.30*  
    (2.56) (2.49) (2.69) (2.78) (3.01) (3.00) (2.89) (3.30)  
 
Coastal    -55.48 -54.61 -67.61 -68.84 -99.87 -98.57 -125.81  -142.88   
    (0.76) (0.71) (0.74) (0.71) (0.88) (0.82) (0.71) (0.72)  
 
Rainfall    0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04  
    (0.63) (0.59) (0.75) (0.75) (0.79) (0.74) (0.21) (0.31)  
 
Black  soil  -13.74  -13.31  -2.90 -3.50 -5.26 -4.62 45.10 35.99  
    (0.21) (0.21) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.35) (0.27)  
 
Alluvial soil  267.21* 268.59* 320.81* 318.84* 398.90* 400.96* 543.71* 525.80*  
    (4.24) (4.31) (4.22) (4.22) (4.31) (4.39) (3.99) (3.89)  
 
Red soil   153.04* 151.24* 202.94* 205.52* 253.37* 250.66* 498.80* 525.35*  
    (2.06) (2.15) (2.23) (2.39) (2.22) (2.33) (2.87) (3.34)  
 
Constant    3878.3 3831.7 5403.5*  5470.0 6797.1*  6727.0 12942*  13554*   
    (1.87) (1.60) (2.15) (1.85) (2.18) (1.84) (2.18) (2.20)  
 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125 116 116  
R-squared  0.454 0.454 0.470 0.470 0.484 0.484 0.490 0.486  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 








  39                                                                          Table 12 
 
  OLS Panel Data Regression with Standard Errors Clustered by District, 1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
                  Agri       Food-Grain       NFG           Urbanization     Mfg.           Service        Population 
                             Prod.       Prod.                Acreage                                 Emp.           Emp.           Density 
                                                                     Share                                      Share         Share 
           1901-1981    1901-1981      1901-1981    1901-1991       1961-1991    1961-1991   1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  65.61*       39.06*             7.41*          4.43*   2.33*          4.03*            22.53 
                (2.65)       (1.97)             (3.04)        (1.95)  (2.44)          (2.42)           (0.38) 
 
Length of   -0.86*      -0.29                -0.03         -0.02               -0.02          -0.03            -2.12 
British Rule  (2.14)         (0.83)              (0.93)        (0.65)   (1.30)          (1.03)          (1.88) 
 
Altitude   0.27*           0.15*  0.02*        -0.002  -0.00          -0.00             -0.17* 
    (2.87)      (2.09)                (3.88)        (1.31)  (0.60)          (0.24)           (3.55) 
   
Latitude   -1.32       -3.58   0.07         -0.06  0.97          0.46*             17.63* 
    (0.48)      (1.32)   (0.30)         (0.23)  (0.80)          (2.60)             (2.78) 
 
Coastal    58.29       51.35   3.67          -0.60  1.68          4.02*             -28.17 
    (1.73)       (1.50)  (1.31)         (0.22)  (1.02)          (2.22)             (0.37) 
 
Rainfall   0.02       0.01    -0.10*          -0.01*  -0.001          -0.002*          0.04 
    (1.02)       (0.38)  (5.39)         (3.17)   (1.09)           (2.05)          (0.64) 
  
Black soil  -77.57*      -70.21*  6.43            3.91  -1.07           0.19             -6.16 
    (2.73)      (2.48)   (1.85)           (1.51)  (1.15)           (0.11)           (0.10) 
 
Alluvial soil  29.78       44.66   1.42           4.39*  2.60*           1.60              269.4* 
    (1.14)      (1.70)   (0.72)          (2.31)  (3.40)           (0.93)          (4.27) 
 
Red soil   89.31*      101.54*   4.38          -0.82  1.33*           2.46              162.48* 
    (2.60)       (2.88)  (1.85)          (0.46)  (2.40)           (1.76)           (2.18) 
 
Constant    1460.9*      527.33  62.85            54.45  38.38          58.08            3646.41 
    (2.02)      (0.81)               (1.18)            (0.92)  (1.28)          (1.12)            (1.78) 
 
Observations  443        444                  443              987    500          500                1038 
R-squared  0.785       0.762               0.373            0.246   0.342          0.191             0.563 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: * significant at 5%. The regressions include year fixed-effects and standard errors are clustered by districts. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Agricultural productivity is in rupees per acre. For 1901-










  40                                                                           Table 13 
 
       OLS Panel Data Regression with Standard Errors Clustered by Province, 1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
                  Agri       Food-Grain        NFG           Urbanization     Mfg.          Service       Population 
                             Prod.       Prod.                Acreage                                  Emp.          Emp.          Density 
                                                                     Share                                      Share          Share 
           1901-1981    1901-1981      1901-1981    1901-1991       1961-1991    1961-1991   1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  65.61       39.1                7.41*          4.43   2.33          4.03              22.53 
                (1.68)       (1.52)             (2.98)        (1.74)  (1.47)          (1.66)           (0.17) 
 
Length of   -0.86      -0.29                -0.03         -0.02               -0.02          -0.03            -2.12 
British Rule  (1.86)        (0.47)              (0.69)        (0.61)  (0.82)          (0.81)          (1.15) 
 
Altitude   0.27             0.15   0.02*        -0.002  -0.00          -0.00             -0.17* 
    (1.47)      (1.35)                (2.95)         (1.09)  (0.49)          (0.17)          (2.89) 
   
Latitude   -1.32       -3.58   0.07         -0.06  0.97          0.46              17.63* 
    (0.36)      (0.86)   (0.25)         (0.26)  (0.83)          (1.64)            (2.07) 
 
Coastal    58.29       51.35   3.67          -0.60  1.68          4.02               -28.17 
    (1.33)       (1.22)  (1.01)         (-0.22)  (0.90)          (1.54)             (0.37) 
 
Rainfall    0.02        0.01   -0.10*          -0.01*  -0.001          -0.002*          0.04 
    (1.43)       (0.34)  (2.87)         (3.83)  (1.00)           (2.12)          (0.56) 
 
Black soil  -77.57*      -70.21*   6.43            3.91  -1.07           0.19             -6.16 
    (3.05)      (2.11)   (1.19)           (1.46)  (1.49)           (0.09)           (0.07) 
 
Alluvial soil  29.78       44.66    1.42           4.39*  2.60*           1.60              269.4* 
    (1.05)      (1.18)   (0.68)          (2.41)  (3.09)           (0.99)          (5.35) 
 
Red soil   89.31*      101.54*   4.38*          -0.82  1.33           2.46*            162.48 
    (4.13)       (3.33)  (2.85)          (0.66)  (1.57)           (2.38)           (1.51) 
 
Constant    1460.9      527.33   62.85            54.45  38.38          58.08            3646.41 
    (1.70)      (0.47)               (0.88)            (0.85)  (0.80)          (0.87)            (1.12) 
 
Observations  443        444                  443              987    500          500                1038 
R-squared  0.785       0.762               0.373            0.246   0.342          0.191             0.563 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: * significant at 5%. The regressions include year fixed-effects and standard errors are clustered by provinces. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Agricultural productivity is in rupees per acre. For 1901-












  41                                                                       Table 14 
 
           OLS Panel Data Regression for Neighboring Districts, 1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
                 Agri        Food-Grain       NFG           Urbanization      Mfg            Service       Population 
                             Prod.       Prod.               Acreage                                  Emp.           Emp.           Density 
                                                                     Share                                      Share           Share 
           1901-1981    1901-1981      1901-1981    1901-1991       1961-1991    1961-1991   1901-1991 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-landlord  35.62       45.87               -4.74          -2.52   -0.26          -1.00             55.29 
                (0.81)       (1.57)             (0.93)        (0.98)  (0.29)          (0.67)           (0.74) 
 
Length of   0.48        0.43               -0.03        -0.06*              -0.02*          -0.04*            -0.68 
British Rule  (1.13)         (1.54)              (0.76)       (2.18)  (2.88)          (3.01)           (0.53) 
 
Altitude   0.15              0.11                0.01          0.01    0.004            -0.00            -1.09* 
    (1.05)       (1.08)               (0.34)        (1.04)   (1.04)          (0.17)          (4.50) 
   
Latitude   -12.0        -28.2*  0.79         -0.17    -0.40           0.31              -6.55 
    (1.47)       (5.02)  (0.54)         (0.30)    (1.61)          (1.14)            (0.35) 
 
Coastal    -51.79       47.42   7.93          5.96    0.50          4.99               6.86 
    (0.58)       (0.63)  (0.59)         (1.14)  (0.25)          (1.75)            (0.04) 
 
Rainfall    -0.09       -0.06   -0.008         -0.006  -0.00          -0.002            0.35* 
    (1.43)       (1.42)  (1.48)         (1.36)  (0.48)           (0.63)          (3.46) 
 
Black soil  -80.01       -51.30               7.67          3.65   -0.86              4.98*            476.57* 
    (1.11)      (1.02)   (0.42)          (0.55)  (0.34)           (2.33)           (3.66) 
 
Alluvial soil  80.67*       52.48*  3.84           2.01    0.68           0.92              197.49 
    (2.58)      (2.12)   (1.20)          (1.04)   (0.95)           (1.11)            (1.71) 
 
Red soil   -54.04      -47.03               5.85          7.10*    2.11*             5.99*            51.80 
    (1.45)       (1.96)  (0.73)          (3.43)   (2.48)           (5.75)           (0.55) 
 
Constant    -482.0         -268.45  50.58           107.0*  38.57*          75.82*          1300.8 
    (0.59)       (0.51)              (0.92)           (2.30)  (3.56)          (3.31)            (0.52) 
 
Observations  109        110                  110            210    120          120                255 
R-squared  0.864       0.831                0.399           0.733   0.759          0.759             0.815 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: * significant at 5%. The regressions include year fixed-effects and standard errors are clustered by districts.  
This sample of neighboring districts consists of 32 districts out of our sample of 148 districts. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Agricultural productivity is in rupees per acre. For 1901-





  42     References 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review 91 
(5): 1369-1401. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: 
Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (4): 1231-1294. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2004. “Institutions as the 
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,” mimeo. 
Ali, Imran. 1988. The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Appu, P.S. 1975. “Tenancy Reform in India,” Economic and Political Weekly 10 (special issue): 
1339-1375. 
Attwood, Donald W. 1992. Raising Cane: The Political Economy of Sugar in Western India. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
Baden-Powell, B. H. 1892. The Land-Systems of British India. 3 Volumes. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Bagchi, Amiya K. Private Investment in India 1900-1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Baker, Christopher J. 1976. “Tamilnad Estates in the Twentieth Century,” Indian Economic and 
Social History Review 13 (1): 1-44. 
Baker, Christopher J. 1984. An Indian Rural Economy 1880-1955. London: Oxford University 
Press. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Paul Gertler, and Maitreesh Ghatak. 2002. “Empowerment and Efficiency: 
Tenancy Reform in West Bengal,” Journal of Political Economy 110 (2): 239-280. 
Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. “History, Institutions and Economic Performance: 
The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” American Economic Review 95 
(4): 1190-1213. 
Bardhan, Pranab K. 1984. Land, Labor and Rural Poverty: Essays in Development Economics. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Besley, Timothy. 1995. “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from 
Ghana,” Journal of Political Economy 103 (5): 903-937. 
Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess. 2000. “Land Reform, Poverty Reduction and Growth: 
Evidence from India,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2): 341-388. 
Blyn, George. 1966. Agricultural Trends in India, 1891-1947: Output, Availability, and 
Productivity. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Bose, Ashish. 1973. Studies in India’s Urbanization 1901-1971. Bombay: Tata McGraw-Hill 
Publishing Company. 
Bose, Sugata. 1993. Peasant Labour and Colonial Capital: Rural Bengal Since 1770. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Boserup, Ester. 1965. The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian 
Change under Population Pressure. New York: Aldine 
Boyce, James K. 1987. Agrarian Impasse in Bengal: Institutional Constraints to Technological 
Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  43Brass, Paul R. 1994. The Politics of India Since Independence. Second Edition. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Brown, Judith M. 1994. Modern India: Origins of Asian Democracy. Second Edition. Oxford 
University Press. 
Charlesworth, Neil. 1985. Peasants and Imperial Rule: Agriculture and Agrarian Society in the 
Bombay Presidency, 1850-1935. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chatterjee, Partha. 1984. Bengal 1920-1947: The Land Question. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & 
Company. 
Chaudhari, B. B. 1975. “The Land Market in Eastern India, 1793-1940: Part I: The Movement of 
Land Prices,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 12 (1): 1-42. 
Chaudhari, B. B. 1984. “Rural Power Structure and Agricultural Productivity in Eastern India, 
1757-1947,” in Agrarian Power Structure and Agricultural Productivity in South Asia, 
eds., M. Desai et al. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Chaudhary, Latika. 2005. “Social Divisions and Public Goods Provision: Evidence from 
Colonial India,” mimeo. 
Clark, Gregory and Susan Wolcott. 2003 “One Polity, Many Countries: Economic Growth in 
India, 1873-2000,” in In Search of Prosperity, ed., D. Rodrik. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Cohn, Bernard S. 1961. “From Indian Status to British Contract,” Journal of Economic History 
21 (4): 613-628. 
Collins, William J. 1999. “Labor Mobility, Market Integration, and Wage Convergence in Late 
19th Century India,” Explorations in Economic History 36: 246-277. 
Davidson, R. and J. G. MacKinnon. 1993. Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Davis, Kingsley. 1951. The Population of India and Pakistan. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Dhanagare, D. N. 1983. Peasant Movements in India 1920-1950. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Dasgupta, Ajit K. 1981. “Agricultural Growth Rates in the Punjab, 1906-1942,” Indian 
Economic and Social History Review 18 (3-4): 327-348. 
Davis, Lance E. and Robert A. Huttenback. 1988. Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The 
Economics of British Imperialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Desai, A. R. 1979. Peasant Struggles in India. Bombay: Oxford University Press. 
Desai, R.C. 1953. Standard of Living in India and Pakistan 1931-2 to 1940-1. Bombay: Popular 
Book Depot. 
Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 1997. “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and 
Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View From Economic 
Historians of the United States,” in How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the 
Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico 1800-1914. Stanford University Press. 
Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2000. “Institutions, Factor Endowments, and 
Paths of Development in the New World,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3): 217-
232. 
Fisher, Michael H. 1993. The Politics of the British Annexation of India 1757-1857. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Frankel, Francine R. 2005. India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
  44Frankel, Francine R. and M. S. A. Rao. 1989. 1990. Dominance and State Power in Modern 
India. Volumes 1 and 2. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Frykenberg, Robert E. 1965. Guntur District 1788-1848: A History of Local Influence and 
Central Authority in South India. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Gadgil, D. R. 1972. The Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times 1860-1939. Fifth Edition. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Guha, Ranajit. 1963. A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent 
Settlement. Paris: Mouton & Co. 
Guha, Sumit. (ed.) 1992. Growth, Stagnation or Decline? Agricultural Productivity in British 
India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Harrison, Mark. 1999. Climates & Constitutions: Health, Race, Environment and British 
Imperialism in India 1600-1850. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heston, Alan W. 1973. “Official Yields Per Acre in India, 1886-1947; Some Questions of 
Interpretation,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 10 (4): 303-332. 
Heston, Alan W. 1978. “A Further Critique of Historical Yields Per Acre in India,” Indian 
Economic and Social History Review 15 (2): 187-210. 
Hunt, Roland and John Harrison. 1980. The District Officer in India 1930-1947. London: Solar 
Press. 
Islam, M.M. 1978. Bengal Agriculture 1920-1946: A Quantitative Study. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Iyer, Lakshmi. 2003. “The Long-term Impact of Colonial Rule: Evidence from India,” mimeo 
Kessinger, Tom G. Vilyatpur 1848-1968: Social and Economic Change in a Northern Indian 
Village. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kumar, Dharma. 1965. Land and Caste in South India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kumar, Ravinder. 1968. Western India in the Nineteenth Century: A Study of the Social History 
of Maharashtra. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishney. 1998a. “Law 
and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy 106 (6): 1113-1155. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishney. 1998b. 
“Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1-2): 3-27. 
Ludden, David. 1984. “Productive Power in Agriculture: A Survey of Work on the Local History 
of British India,” in Agrarian Power Structure and Agricultural Productivity in South 
Asia, eds., M. Desai et al. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
McAlpin, Michelle B. 1983. Subject to Famine: Food Crises and Economic Change in Western 
India, 1860-1920. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Mishra, Satish Chandra. 1983. “On the Reliability of Pre-independence Agricultural Statistics in 
Bombay and Punjab,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 20 (2): 171-190. 
Mukherjee, Nilmani. 1962. The Ryotwari System in Madras 1792-1827. Calcutta: Firma K.L. 
Mukhopadhyay. 
Munshi, Kaivan and Mark Rosenzweig. 2005. “Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social 
Insurance, Inequality, and Growth,” mimeo. 
Nakazato, Nariaki. 1994. Agrarian System in Eastern Bengal: 1870-1910. Calcutta: KP Baggchi 
& Co. 
Neale, Walter C. 1962. Economic Change in Rural India: Land Tenure and Reform in Uttar 
Pradesh, 1800-1955. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
  45North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
North, Douglass C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” 
Journal of Economic History 49 (4): 803-832. 
Panda, Chitta. 1996. The Decline of the Bengal Zamindars: Midnapore 1870-1920. Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
Pray, Carl E. 1984. “Accuracy of Official Agricultural Statistics and the Sources of Growth in 
the Punjab, 1907-1947,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 21 (3): 313-333. 
Ray, Ratnalekha. 1979. Change in Bengal Agrarian Society c1760-1850. New Delhi: Manohar. 
Ranga, N. G. 1979. “Agrarian Revolts,” in Peasant Struggles in India, ed., A. Desai. Bombay: 
Oxford University Press. 
Raychaudhuri, S. P., et. 1963. Soils of India. New Delhi: Council of Agricultural Research. 
Reddy, G. Ram. 1989. “The Politics of Accommodation: Caste, Class and Dominance in Andhra 
Pradesh,” in Dominance and State Power in Modern India. Volumes 1. eds., F. Frankel 
and M. Rao. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Roy, Tirthankar. 2000. The Economic History of India 1857-1947. Oxford. Oxford University 
Press. 
Roy, Tirthankar. 2002. “Economic History and Modern India: Redefining the Link,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16 (3): 109-130. 
Saran, P. 1973. The Provincial Government of the Mughals 1526-1658. Bombay: Asia 
Publishing House. 
Shukla, Prabhat K. 1993. Indigo and the Raj: Peasant Protests in Bihar 1780-1917. Delhi: 
Pragati Publications. 
Sivasubramonian, S. 1960. “Estimates of Gross Value of Output of Agriculture for Undivided 
India 1900-01 to 1946-47,” in Papers on National Income and Allied Topics, Volume I, 
eds., V. K. R. V. Rao et al. New York: Asia Publishing House: 231-251. 
Sivasubramonian, S. 2000. The National Income of Indian in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Stein, Burton. 1989. Thomas Munro: The Origins of the Colonial State and His Vision of 
Empire. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Stokes, Eric. 1959. The English Utilitarians and India. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Stokes, Eric. 1978. The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion 
in Colonial India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tomlinson, B. R. 1993. The Economy of Modern India 1860-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Whitcombe, Elizabeth. 1983. “Irrigation,” in The Cambridge Economic History of India, Volume 
2. eds. D. Kumar and M. Desai. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wolcott, Susan and Gregory Clark. 1999. “Why Nations Fail: Managerial Decisions and 
Performance in Indian Cotton Textiles, 1890-1938,” Journal of Economic History 59 (2): 
397-423. 
Yanagisawa, Haruka. 1996. A Century of Change: Caste and Irrigated Lands in Tamil Nadu 
1860’s-1870’s. New Delhi: Manohar. 
 
  46